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ARREST—REASONABLENESS:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PERMITS
INVESTIGATIVE STOPS BASED ON ANONYMOUS TIPS
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
ABSTRACT
In Navarette v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that a
traffic stop based on an anonymous, but reliable, tip did not violate the
Fourth Amendment where the tip provided the officer with reasonable
suspicion. The Court reasoned that the 911 call provided adequate
indications of reliability to verify the credibility of the caller. Therefore, the
officer was justified in relying on an anonymous tip to make an
investigative traffic stop. By the caller’s specific details of the truck and the
incident, the Court reasoned that the caller claimed eyewitness knowledge
of the alleged reckless driving, which supported the reliability of the
anonymous tip. The Court also reasoned that the caller’s report of being
run off the road created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime of drunk
driving. As a result, the Court’s holding in Navarette allows law
enforcement to make an investigative stop with minimal justification.
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FACTS

On August 23, 2008, a 911-dispatch team for the California Highway
Patrol received a call from the dispatch team of a neighboring county.1 The
neighboring county’s dispatcher relayed an anonymous tip from a
concerned citizen.2 The concerned citizen alleged a truck had ran her off
the roadway and provided the exact make and color of the truck, the license
plate on the truck, and the mile marker where the incident occurred.3 The
dispatch team then broadcasted that information to highway patrol officers.4

1. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1686-87. The county dispatcher reported the tip as follows: “Showing southbound
Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David-94925. Ran the reporting
party off the roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.” Id.
4. Id. at 1687.
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Two highway patrol officers responded to the broadcast. The first
officer passed the vehicle matching the description at 4:00 p.m. near mile
marker sixty-nine.5 The officer pulled this vehicle over at about 4:05 p.m.6
The second officer responding to the broadcast then arrived on the scene.7
Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers smelled marijuana.8 After
searching the vehicle, the officers discovered thirty pounds of marijuana in
the bed of the vehicle.9 The driver of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette,
and the passenger, José Prado Navarette, were subsequently arrested.10
At trial, the petitioners moved to suppress the evidence of the
marijuana, arguing that the traffic stop was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.11 Both the magistrate and the superior court found the traffic stop
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.12 The California Court of Appeals
affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment determining that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop.13 Consequently, the
petitioners pled guilty to transporting marijuana and received ninety days in
jail plus three years of probation.14 The California Supreme Court denied
review.15 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed
the court of appeals’s conclusion.16
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be
reasonable.17 The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”18
An exception to the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement to
conduct brief investigative stops when a law enforcement officer reasonably

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Id.
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believes that “criminal activity may be afoot . . . .”19 In other words, law
enforcement may temporarily detain an individual when the officer
reasonably believes that the individual has committed a crime, is
committing a crime, or is about to commit a crime.20 While contextualizing
Navarette, it is important to understand the background of the Court’s
interpretation of reasonable suspicion and to examine the precedent of
anonymous tips involving investigatory stops.
A. REASONABLE SUSPICION PERMITTING INVESTIGATIVE STOPS
The Supreme Court has permitted law enforcement to conduct
investigative stops when an officer has a reasonable and articulable belief
that an individual is involved in criminal conduct.21 In Terry v. Ohio, a
plain-clothed officer observed two men standing on the corner of the
street.22 The officer observed one man walk down the street, pause
momentarily to look into a store window, then turn around to return to the
street corner with the other man.23 The officer then observed the other man
walk down the street to stop and look in the same window as the first
man.24 The officer watched the two men for a period of time in which they
both continued to repeat this behavior about twelve times in total between
them.25 The officer grew suspicious of the men while observing them.26
He suspected the men of inspecting the store in preparation for robbing it.27
The officer testified that he thought they might have a gun.28 He then
approached the men and asked for identification.29 When one man
mumbled something, the officer grabbed Terry, spun him around, and
patted down the outside of his clothing.30 The search revealed a weapon in
Terry’s coat, and a subsequent search of the other man also revealed a
gun.31 The officer testified that he had worked this patrol for a substantial
19. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-18 (1981) (permitting investigative stops under the totality of the circumstances when an
officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.”).
20. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.
21. See id.
22. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5..
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id.
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period of time and had developed habits of watching people to determine
whether suspicious activity was occurring.32
The men were charged with carrying a concealed weapon, and they
subsequently moved to suppress the evidence on the basis of the stop being
unlawful.33 The Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the officer reasonably believed the men were
armed and dangerous.34 The Court reasoned that the stop was justified
because the officer’s observance of unusual behavior, coupled with his
experience, allowed him to reasonably conclude that the individuals were
armed and dangerous and that “criminal activity may be afoot . . . .”35 The
Terry decision provides a definition of reasonable suspicion permitting an
investigative stop: “specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”
leading an officer to reasonably believe that “criminal activity is afoot.”36
The Terry decision provides that a law enforcement officer may not
base reasonable suspicion upon “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion of
‘hunch,’” but rather he must base it upon “the specific reasonable inferences
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”37
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause
because the “level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”38 Reasonable suspicion
under the totality of the circumstances standard is “dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.”39
B. ANONYMOUS TIPS
Supreme Court precedent permits law enforcement to make
investigative stops based on anonymous tips.40 In Alabama v. White, a
police department received an anonymous phone call with specific facts
alleging that a woman would be leaving an apartment building at a certain
time.41 The anonymous tipster gave police the specific make and color of
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 29.
35. Id. at 30.
36. Id. at 21.
37. Id. at 27.
38. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989).
39. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417 (1981)).
40. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). The Court in Adams provided that
reasonable suspicion for a investigative stop can be based on information from another person, not
just the officer’s personal observation. Id. at 147.
41. White, 496 U.S. at 327.
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the vehicle and indicated the vehicle’s right taillight was broken.42 The
tipster told police the woman would be driving to a specific motel and there
would be cocaine in the car.43 Police officers observed the woman leave
the apartment and get into the specific car.44 The officers followed the
woman and stopped her just short of the motel alleged in the tip.45 The
officers found marijuana and cocaine in the vehicle.46 The woman moved
to suppress the drugs on Fourth Amendment grounds.47 The Supreme
Court upheld the traffic stop, finding that under the totality of the
circumstances, the anonymous tip was corroborated by the police
observations and thusly exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify
the investigate stop.48 The Court reasoned that the anonymous tip rose to a
higher level of reliability because of the tipster’s ability to predict the
woman’s future behavior.49 The tipster’s ability to predict the woman’s
future behavior demonstrated that the caller had a special familiarity with
the woman’s affairs and police could reasonably believe that a person with
inside information was likely to have access to reliable information.50
The Court revisited the issue of anonymous tips in Florida v. J.L.51 In
J.L., the Miami-Dade Police Department received an anonymous call
reporting that a young man in a plaid shirt standing at a specific bus stop
was carrying a gun.52 Officers approached the man in the plaid shirt,
frisked him, and seized a gun; aside from what was reported in the tip, they
had no reason to suspect illegal activity was afoot.53 The Court noted that
the tip lacked reliability because it provided no predictive information and
no indications of the caller’s knowledge or credibility.54 The Court
reasoned that the officers’ corroboration of seeing the man in a plaid shirt at
a bus stop was a bare-bones tip that did not show the caller had any
knowledge of criminal activity.55 Thus, the Court held an anonymous tip

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 331.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Court stated that because the caller’s predictions were verified, it was reasonable
to believe that the caller was honest and well-informed of the woman’s
activities—enough to justify stopping the woman’s car. Id.
51. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
52. Id. at 268.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 271.
55. Id.
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lacking indicia of reliability does not justify an investigative stop.56 The
Court declined to adopt a firearm exception to the reliability analysis
because it felt an automatic firearm exception would reach too far and allow
anyone seeking to harass someone to simply place an anonymous tip of an
individual carrying a gun, which would justify a search of that individual.57
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS
In Navarette v. California, Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Supreme Court, which held that the implicated stop did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the
officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated.58 In order
to reach this conclusion, the Court first found the caller had eyewitness
knowledge of the alleged reckless driving, which supported the reliability of
the anonymous tip.59 Next, the Court reasoned that the caller’s report of
being run off the road created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime.60
Then, the Court found the police officer’s failure to corroborate the alleged
reckless behavior did not dismiss the reasonable suspicion of drunk
driving.61
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
When deciding the issue of whether the anonymous 911 tip created
sufficient reasonable suspicion to permit the traffic stop, the Court first
considered the reliability of the anonymous tip alleging the reckless
driving.62 The Court then considered whether the 911 caller’s tip created
reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk driving. 63 Finally,
the Court discussed the issue of the police officer’s failure to corroborate
the alleged reckless behavior.64
1.

Reliability of the Anonymous Tip

The Court concluded that the anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable
for the officer to rely on the caller’s credibility to make the traffic stop.
First, because the caller reported the specific details of the vehicle that had
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 274.
Id. at 272-73.
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014).
Id. at 1689.
Id. at 1690-91.
Id. at 1691.
Id. at 1688.
Id. at 1690.
Id. at 1691.
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run her off the road, the caller provided eyewitness knowledge of the
alleged dangerous driving.65 The Court reasoned that a driver’s claim of
being run off the road by another vehicle implies that the caller knew the
other car was driven dangerously.66 Thus, the Court noted the basis of the
tipster’s knowledge further supported the reliability of the tip.67
Next, the Court noted that the timeline of the events suggested that the
caller called 911 shortly after she was run off the road.68 The Court stated:
“That sort of contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially
reliable.”69 The Court also noted that the stress of excitement caused by the
startling nature of being run off the road was in line with the “present sense
impressions” and “excited utterances” hearsay exceptions, both of which
treat contemporaneous statements as trustworthy.70
Finally, the Court noted that the caller’s use of the 911 emergency
system provided further credibility to the caller’s tip.71 The Court reasoned
that the 911 emergency system includes features that permit law
enforcement to verify and trace important information about the caller,
which acts as a safeguard preventing false reports.72 The Court found “a
reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice
before using such a system.”73 Thus, the caller’s use of 911 was a relevant
circumstance that justified the officer’s reliance on the information in the
tip.74
2.

Reasonable Suspicion of Drunk Driving

Next, the Court determined whether the caller’s report of being run off
the road created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime—in contrast to

65. Id. at 1689.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983)). Gates provided: “[An
informant’s] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that
the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the
case.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 (alteration in original).
68. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. Police located the truck roughly nineteen miles south of
the location the caller alleged the reckless driving took place and roughly eighteen minutes after
the 911 call. Id.
69. Id. The Court pointed to evidence law, which treats contemporaneous statements as
more trustworthy because “substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.” Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(1)
advisory committee’s note (2014)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1689-90.
73. Id. at 1690.
74. Id.
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an isolated incident of past reckless conduct.75 The Court took a
commonsense approach when discussing common behaviors indicative of
drunk driving.76 The Court stated that a reliable tip alleging dangerous
behaviors, such as weaving all over the road, crossing over the center line
on a highway, and almost causing head-on collisions, would generally
justify an officer to make a traffic stop on suspicion of drunk driving. 77 In
this case, the Court noted that the driver “reported more than a minor traffic
[violation] and more than a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless
driving.”78 The caller reported a specific and dangerous act that caused the
caller to be run off the road.79 The Court provided that the petitioner’s
conduct “bears too great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of
drunk driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness.”80
The Court did not find it unreasonable to stop the driver whose alleged
conduct was indicative of drunk driving under these circumstances.81 The
Court further noted that the petitioners’ argument that the reported behavior
could be explained by a distracted driver was unavailing because the Court
had consistently pointed out that reasonable suspicion does not need to
disregard the possibility of innocent conduct.82
3.

Corroboration of Alleged Reckless Driving

The majority spent little time on the issue of the police officer’s failure
to observe any additional suspicious conduct after tailing the truck for five
minutes.83 Justice Thomas stated that it is not surprising that the sight of a
police car tailing a driver would invoke careful driving. 84 The majority
took the approach that the police officer did not need to corroborate the
criminal activity alleged in the tip because the officer already had
reasonable suspicion and it would be unsafe to allow a drunk driver another
chance to cause dangerous results.85

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1690-91.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1691.
79. Id.
80. Id. The court suggests that lane-positioning problems, decreased vigilance, and impaired
judgment—a combination of recognized drunk driving cues—can be inferred from the conduct of
running another vehicle off the road. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1691-92.
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B. JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENTING OPINION
Under the majority’s opinion, an uncorroborated, yet reliable,
anonymous tip can provide an officer with reasonable suspicion to make an
investigative traffic stop.86 Justice Scalia delivered a strongly-worded
dissent calling into doubt: “(1) that anonymous 911 reports of traffic
violations are reliable so long as they correctly identify a car and its
location, and (2) that a single instance of careless or reckless driving
necessarily supports a reasonable suspicion of drunkeness.”87 Justice Scalia
described the new rule stemming from the majority opinion thusly: “[s]o
long as the caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims of a single
instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will
support a traffic stop.”88
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, found the caller’s specific
details about the vehicle’s make, license plate, and location to be
sufficiently reliable.
Justice Scalia argued that these facts are
generally-available knowledge that anyone who saw the car and wanted it
stopped would see.89 Justice Scalia further suggested that the generally
available knowledge provided by the caller “in no way makes it plausible
that the tipster saw the car run someone off the road.”90 Justice Scalia also
disagreed with the majority’s reliance on the contemporaneous nature of the
911 call.91
In addition, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s analysis of the
reliability of the 911 emergency system.92 Justice Scalia disagreed that the
emergency system can easily determine important information regarding the
caller.93 He also found the fact that 911 callers could be identified
unpersuasive because the identity and location of the caller in this case was
unknown.94 Furthermore, he asserted it only matters if the caller is aware
that his or her information might be discovered.95

86. Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1697.
88. Id. at 1692.
89. Id. at 1693.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1693-94. Justice Scalia pointed out that the caller had time to observe the license
plate, stop her car, and write down the license plate number, which, he says, would be a difficult
task if she was run off the road and the car was speeding off. Id. at 1694. Justice Scalia adds that
this is “[p]lenty of time to dissemble or embellish” the facts. Id.
92. Id. at 1694.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Justice Scalia also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation that the
caller’s report rose to the level of reasonable suspicion of drunk driving.96
The caller never made an accusation of drunk driving.97 According to
Justice Scalia, it was entirely plausible that the petitioner may have been
distracted and swerved as a result.98 Justice Scalia stated: “I fail how to see
how reasonable suspicion of a discrete instance of irregular or hazardous
driving generates a reasonable suspicion of ongoing intoxicated driving.”99
In order to make an investigate traffic stop, there must be suspicion of an
ongoing crime.100
The dissenting opinion further disagreed with the majority’s view that
the anonymous tip did not need to be corroborated.101 Justice Scalia
pointed to the fact that the officers followed the petitioners for five minutes
and did not witness a single traffic violation.102 Justice Scalia suggested
that the anonymous tip was discredited when the officers did not observe a
traffic violation.103 He suggested that the majority seemed to think that a
drunk driver has the ability to make a conscious decision to no longer drive
indicative of a drunk driver.104 He also took the viewpoint that if the driver
was drunk, the driver would have undoubtedly exhibited irregular driving
conduct again.105 Thus, Justice Scalia found that because the driver failed
to commit another infraction and the only basis for the further investigation
was a vague and anonymous tip, the Fourth Amendment required the driver
to be left alone.106
IV. IMPACT OF DECISION AND APPLICATION TO
NORTH DAKOTA LAW
Drunk driving is a very serious and dangerous problem in the state of
North Dakota107 and across the nation.108 Under the Court’s holding in
96. Id. at 1695.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis in original).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1696.
102. Id.
103. Id. Scalia provided a hypothetical implying that if a police officer’s personal
observation is contrary to the informant’s tip, than that tip is discredited. Id.
104. Id. at 1697.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. North Dakota Tops Nation in Drunk Driving Deaths, VALLEY NEWS LIVE (Mar. 12,
2013), http://www.valleynewslive.com/story/21604798/north-dakota-tops-nation-indrunk-drivingdeaths (reporting that 45 percent of deaths in North Dakota involve drunk driving).
108. DEPT. OF TRANSP, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Traffic Safety Facts
2012 Data: Alcohol-Impaired Driving (Dec. 2013), http://www-nrd nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/
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Navarette, law enforcement will be able to make a valid investigative traffic
stop with minimal justification based on an anonymous tip.109 This creates
a difficult dilemma. On one hand, Navarette promotes public safety
concerns surrounding drunk driving.110 On the other hand, it puts every
person who chooses to drive at risk of a potentially intrusive traffic stop.111
A. ANONYMOUS YET RELIABLE TIP?
If the majority had followed the ruling in J.L., the anonymous tip
would have lacked the indicia of reliability to justify the investigative traffic
stop.112 After Navarette, however, all that is required to report a tip of
reckless driving is to provide the make of the car, license plate, location,
and a single instance of reckless or irregular driving.113 Like the
anonymous tip in J.L. of a young man standing by a bus stop in a plaid
shirt, the specific details of the truck’s make, license plate, and location
reported by the anonymous caller in Navarette lack the reliability to justify
an investigative stop.114 The details of the vehicle provide no predictive
information to prove that the caller had any knowledge of criminal activity
by the petitioner.115 The description of the vehicle could have been
provided by anyone on the road.116
The Navarette decision has provided a rule that mere specific,
anonymous claims of a traffic violation will permit investigative traffic
stops.117 Anyone with a grudge and knowledge of a person’s car and
location can now make an anonymous tip that will likely result in an
intrusive and potentially unwarranted traffic stop.118 Given this ruling, it is
likely that traffic stops based on anonymous tips alleging reckless conduct
will increase in the future.
811870.pdf (noting that the number of deaths involving alcohol-impaired driving crashes was
10,322 in 2012).
109. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia recited the rule from
the majority in his dissent as: “So long as the caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims
of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will support a traffic
stop.” Id.
110. Id. at 1691-92 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Scalia provided: “Drunken driving
is a serious matter, but so is the loss of our freedom to come and go as we please without police
interference.” Id.
112. See discussion supra Part III.B.
113. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1693.
115. See discussion supra Part III.B.
116. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1697. “All the malevolent 911 caller need to do is assert a traffic violation, and
the targeted car will be stopped, forcibly if necessary, by the police.” Id.
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B. THE ISSUE OF ANONYMOUS TIPS WITHOUT POLICE
CORROBORATION CREATING REASONABLE SUSPICION
OF DRUNK DRIVING TO STOP A VEHICLE
Prior to the Navarette decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court had
ruled on the issue of anonymous tips creating reasonable suspicion to stop a
vehicle without police corroboration.119 In Anderson v. Director, North
Dakota Department of Transportation, a motorist called the Cass County
Sheriff’s Office to report a potentially reckless or drunk driver because the
caller had allegedly seen the driver hit a construction cone.120 The caller
reported the license plate number, color, and make of the vehicle.121 The
dispatcher only relayed to the responding officer that the caller had
witnessed a “possible reckless or drunk driver”—not that the driver had hit
a construction cone.122 The responding deputy followed the driver for
about two miles before making a traffic stop.123 The deputy did not observe
the driver commit any traffic violations before the stop.124 The driver was
subsequently arrested for drunk driving.125
The Anderson court detailed three situations providing an officer with
reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop, one of which was “when the
officer received tips from other police officers or informants, which were
then corroborated by the officer’s own observations.”126 The court
concluded that the “bare assertion” of a potentially drunk driver without any
police corroboration did not rise to the level of “sufficient quantity to
provide the reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the
stop . . . .”127
In light of Navarette, the “bare assertion” of a potentially drunk driver
now likely rises to the level of reasonable suspicion to justify an
investigative traffic stop with no police corroboration of criminal activity.
Police officers can now make a traffic stop based on an anonymous tip
specifying the car, the location, and alleging reckless driving
conduct—without the officer ever personally witnessing any criminal
activity. Thus, the number of traffic stops in North Dakota for reckless or
drunk driving based on anonymous tips will likely increase.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Anderson v. Dir., N.D. Dept. of Transp., 2005 ND 97, 696 N.W.2d 918.
Id. ¶ 2, 696 N.W.2d at 919.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19, 696 N.W.2d at 923.
Id. ¶ 3, 696 N.W.2d at 919.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 9, 696 N.W.2d at 920 (citing In re T.J.K., 1999 ND 152, 598 N.W.2d 781).
Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 696 N.W.2d at 923.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Navarette, the Supreme Court held that the traffic stop conducted
pursuant to an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the
officer had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop.128 While this
decision promotes the safety of the public by making it easier for law
enforcement to take drunk drivers off the road, it puts every driver on the
road at risk of a potentially intrusive traffic stop. As a result of Navarette,
traffic stops for reckless or drunk driving based upon anonymous tips will
likely increase.
Peter Hvidston*

128. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014).
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